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LABOR LAW-ARBITRATION-AGREEMENTS
TO ARBITRATE IN WEST VIRGINIA
Arbitration clauses are commonly found in commercial con-
tracts and are generally of two types: unlimited clauses which
cover any and all disputes arising out of the contract; and, limited
clauses which specify that only specific disputes are to be deter-
mined by arbitration. Parties who decide that arbitration is the
best means for resolving their differences generally honor their
agreements to arbitrate and carry out the award of the arbitrator.
However, the parties probably do not know or give little thought
to the legal status of arbitration.
The settlement of disputes by arbitration is of common law
origin; however, all of the states have enacted arbitration statutes
of one kind or another.' Therefore, today's arbitration law is de-
rived either from the common law or from statute, or from both.
Many statutes are so general in nature that details have to be
supplied from court decisions under common law. Other arbitra-
tion statutes are often found not to abrogate the common law but
are cumulative rather than exclusive. 2 The determination of
whether the legal status of arbitration is governed by the common
law or by statute is critical in some contract disputes.
I. COMMON LAW ARBrRATION
It is beyond the scope of this article to trace the history of
common law arbitration. The more important principles in com-
mon law arbitration have been summarized as follows:
Common-law arbitration rests upon a voluntary agreement
of the parties to submit their dispute to an outsider. The sub-
mission agreement may be oral and may be revoked at any time
before the rendering of the award. The tribunal, permanent or
temporary, may be composed of any number of arbitrators.
They must be free from bias and interest in the subject matter
and may not be related by affinity or consanguinity to either
party. The arbitrators need not be sworn. Only existing disputes
may be submitted to them. The parties must be given notice of
hearings and are entitled to be present when all the evidence is
received. The arbitrators have no power to subpoena witnesses
'16 S. WILUSTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1921B (3d ed. 1976).
2 Jones, Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards-Common Law Confusion and
Statutory Clarification, 31 S. CAL. L. Rzv. 1 (1957).
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or records and need not conform to legal rules of hearing proce-
dure other than to give the parties an opportunity to present all
competent evidence. All the arbitrators must attend the hear-
ings, consider the evidence jointly, and arrive at an award by
an unanimous vote. The award may be oral, but if written all
the arbitrators must sign it. It must dispose of every substantial
issue submitted to arbitration. An award may be set aside only
for fraud, misconduct, gross mistake or substantial breach of a
common-law rule. The only method of enforcing the common-
law award is to file suit upon it and the judgment thus obtained
may be enforced as any other judgment. In so far as a state
arbitration statute fails to state a correlative rule and is not in
conflict with any of these common-law rules, it may be said that




In 1920 New York adopted one of the most comprehensive and
most utilized arbitration statutes.4 The New York Arbitration Law
and the Uniform Arbitration Act have been used as models for
many state statutes.' In the controversy of common law versus
statutory arbitration, the legal status of arbitration statutes in the
various states falls into three principal categories:'
1) states where the common law is decisive, and the provi-
sions of statutory arbitration are cumulative and concurrent rather
than exclusive;
2) states with arbitration statutes that create substantive as
well as procedural rights, but common law arbitration is retained.
(The parties may choose which method they will follow); and
3) states whose statutes create substantive rights and the
courts have held the statutes to be so comprehensive as to rule out
common law arbitration.7
F. ELKOuU & E. ELKouPj, How ARBrrRAriON WORKS 21 (rev. ed. 1960).
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §§ 7500-14 (McKinney 1963).
The Uniform Arbitration Law was adopted by the National Conference of the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1955, approved by the House of Delegates
of the American Bar Association in 1955, and has been used as a model for arbitra-
tion statutes in eighteen jurisdictions. 16 S. WILLISTON, WILISION ON CONTRACTS §
1921B (3d ed. 1976).
Id. § 1921A.
The United States Congress has adopted a basic Federal Arbitration Act
which declares public policy favoring arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act is
[Vol. 79
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It is not the purpose of this article to give a detailed study on
the provisions of all state arbitration statutes. However, provisions
along the following general lines are frequently found in the
"modern" statutes.
1. Agreements to arbitrate existing and future disputes are
made valid and enforceable.
2. Courts are given jurisdiction to compel arbitration, or to
stay arbitration if no agreement to arbitrate exists.
3. Courts are given jurisdiction to stay litigation when one
party to an arbitrable dispute attempts to take it to court in-
stead of arbitrating.
4. Courts are authorized to appoint arbitrators where the par-
ties fail to provide a method for appointment.
5. Majority action by arbitration boards is authorized.
6. Provision is made for oath by the arbitrator and/or wit-
nesses, unless waived by the parties.
7. Default proceedings (in the absence of a party) are author-
ized under certain circumstances.
8. Provision is made for continuances and adjournments of
hearings.
9. Limitation is placed upon the effect of waivers of the right
to be represented by counsel.
10. Arbitrators are given the subpoena power.
11. Awards are required to be in writing and signed by the
arbitrator, and some limitation is stated regarding the time
within which awards must be rendered.
12. Arbitrators are granted limited authority to modify or cor-
rect awards.
13. A summary procedure is provided for (1) court confirma-
tion of awards, (2) court vacation of awards on limited grounds
stated by the statute, (3) court modification or correction of
awards on limited grounds stated by the statute.
14. Courts are authorized to enter judgment upon awards as
confirmed, modified, or corrected; the judgment is then enforce-
able as any other judgment.
15. Provision is made for appeals from court orders and judg-
ments under the statute.8
Most statutes provide that such arbitration is voluntary. At com-
mon law arbitration was voluntary, and courts have generally de-
limited to transactions of a maritime nature or involving commerce. 9 U.S.C.A. §§
1-14 (1970).
KF. ELKOURI & E. EKouni, How ARsrrRAToN WoRKs, 22-23 (rev. ed. 1960).
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clared compulsory arbitration statutes unconstitutional on the
grounds of denial of due process or right to trial by jury.'
III. ARBITRATION IN WEST VIRGINIA
If parties in West Virginia desire to include arbitration clauses
in commercial contracts, they are faced with the problem of deter-
mining whether the arbitration clause forces the parties to final
award before any litigation can be initiated to challenge the con-
tract or any provision thereof, or if the arbitration agreement can
be revoked before award.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals faced this ques-
tion in the recent case of Board of Education v. Miller.'" The par-
ties had entered into a construction contract that included the
following clause:
All claims, disputes and other matters in question arising out
of, or relating to this Contract or the breach thereof,. . .shall
be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction
Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation then obtaining unless the parties mutually agree other-
wise. This agreement to arbitrate shall be specifically enforcea-
ble under the prevailing arbitration law. The award rendered by
the arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may be entered
upon it in accordance with applicable law in any court having
jurisdiction thereof."
The case was heard on appeal from an order of the Circuit Court
of Berkeley County in which that court refused to dissolve a pre-
liminary injunction obtained by the Board of Education to restrain
Miller from invoking and proceeding with the arbitration proce-
dures as provided in the contract.
The appellant, Miller, asked the court to decide whether,
under state law, parties to a contract that contains a standard
arbitration form have a right to revoke such agreement up to the
time award issues or whether, by the execution of such contract,
the parties are compelled to submit to arbitration by virtue of their
mutual promises. The Board contended that the court need only
I See generally, Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 432, 440, 445 (1957). At the federal level,
the Railway Labor Arbitration Act provides for compulsory arbitration. 45 U.S.C.A.
§ 151 et seq. (1972).
20 221 S.E.2d 882 (W. Va. 1975).
" Id. at 885.
[Vol. 79
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decide if the parties had a right to demand the enforcement of the
agreement to arbitrate future disputes. However, the court found
the more conclusive issue to be "whether the parties have a con-
tractual obligation to submit the dispute to arbitration before ei-
ther may resort to court action."'" The court held that parties may
lawfully contract to make the "decision of arbitrators or any third
person a condition precedent to a right of action upon the con-
tract." 3
In reaching its decision the court traced the history of arbitra-
tion in West Virginia. West Virginia has a general arbitration
statute" primarily designed for commercial disputes. The West
Virginia statutes provide in part:
Persons desiring to end any controversy, whether there be
a suit pending therefor or not, may submit the same to arbitra-
tion, and agree that such submission may be entered of record
in any court .... -
No such submission, entered or agreed to be entered of
record, in any court, shall be revocable by any party to such
submission, without the leave of such court .... "1
In a case involving submission under the statute, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that when parties volun-
tarily agree to submit a controversy to arbitration, providing the
award shall be entered as the judgment of the court, the agreement
could not be revoked without leave of such court. 7 However, the
court has acknowledged the viability of common law arbitration
principles by holding that while agreements to submit existing
disputes are not revocable, and bar a suit upon the demand sub-
mitted, a provision to submit any future controversy will not
prevent an action. 8 The language of the arbitration statute,
"[p]ersons desiring to end any controversy,"" was felt to imply
that the provision applied only to existing controversies. At com-
mon law, as a general rule, a party can always revoke its agreement
to arbitrate before award, but under the West Virginia arbitration
" Id. at 883.
" Id. at 882.
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-10-1 et seq. (1966).
" Id. § 55-10-1.
I' Id. § 55-10-2.
, Stiringer v. Toy, 33 W. Va. 86, 10 S.E. 26 (1889).
" Turner v. Stewart, 51 W. Va. 493, 41 S.E. 924 (1902).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-10-1 (1966).
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statute, an agreement by the parties, in court or out of court, that
the award be entered as judgment in court is not revocable."0 The
West Virginia statutory provisions are supplementary to common
law arbitration, providing a remedy rather than a substantive
right.2' Common law arbitration is decisive in West Virginia, and
matters not covered by the current statutory provisions have been
and will be supplied by court decisions under the common law.
Additionally, the arbitration statutes are applicable only to sub-
mission of arbitration agreements and not to the arbitration clause
itself.
In holding that the parties in Miller could agree to binding
arbitration, the court utilized a common law exception that an
agreement to arbitrate future controversies is not revocable where
it has been made a condition precedent to a right of action. 2  This
exception was first recognized in West Virginia in 1891.23 Notwith-
standing the common law exception, the court still had to find
that the language in the arbitration clause created a condition
precedent to the right of the parties to sue.24
According to Miller, Pettus v. Olga Coal Co.2" established a
"broad rule which greatly diminished the scope of the old common-
law right to revoke agreements to arbitrate future disputes."26
Pettus held that:
A contract providing a procedure for arbitration of disputes,
and providing that "all claims, demands or actions growing
therefrom or involved therein shall be by the contracting par-
ties settled and determined exclusively by the machinery pro-
vided in the" contract, creates a condition precedent to any
right of action or suit arising under the contract."
In holding that the language created a condition precedent to the
right of the parties to sue, the Pettus court found the word
Riley v. Jarvis, 43 W. Va. 43, 26 S.E. 366 (1896).
21 Hughes v. National Fuel Co., 121 W. Va. 392, 3 S.E.2d 621 (1939).
2 Condon v. South Side R.R. Co., 55 Va. (14 Grat.) 302 (1858).
Kinney v. Baltimore & Ohio Emp. Rel. Ass'n., 35 W. Va. 385, 14 S.E. 8
(1891).
21 A condition precedent may arise not only by express language but also by
necessary implication in the arbitration procedure. Pettus v. Olga Coal Co., 137 W.
Va. 492, 72 S.E.2d 881 (1952).
2Id.
26 221 S.E.2d at 885.
137 W. Va. at 493, 72 S.E.2d at 882 (Syllabus point 3).
[Vol. 79
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"exclusively" to be significant in creating a condition precedent by
necessary implication in the arbitration procedure. The court
found the language differences in the arbitration clauses in Pettus
and Miller to be minor and insignificant. In Miller the phrases
"shall be decided by arbitration" and "shall be specifically en-
forceable" were crucial in creating a condition precedent." In the
court's opinion, such language rendered "proceeding by arbitration
mandatory." 9 The majority held that the Pettus application of the
common law exception to the common law rule was valid. In the
dissenting opinion, Justice Berry agreed with the common law
exception that if arbitration is made a condition precedent to any
right of action, the arbitration agreement cannot be revoked or
rejected. However, in the present case, he did not feel the language
in the arbitration clause under consideration supported such a
conclusion."
In his concurring opinion, Justice Neely asserted that the ma-
jority should not have relied on an exception to the common law
rule, but should have abolished "archaic rules regarding arbitra-
tion which are passe' and ineffective." 1 Once the court recognized
the advantage of binding arbitration, Justice Neely felt the court
should have overruled all outdated prior cases and clearly stated
that "parties who undertake to arbitrate must do so, and further
that the judgment of the arbitrator cannot be challenged in the
courts except for fraud. '3 2
At common law, arbitration was favored as a means of ending
litigation.3 Nevertheless, the principle that parties could not by
agreement deprive the courts of their jurisdiction has been used to
justify the common law rule that either party could revoke his
agreement at any time prior to award.34 Clearly the majority in
Miller believed that to overrule this common law principle would
be too drastic a change.2 5 Since the court felt the "wisdom of the
2 221 S.E.2d at 885.
22 Id.
Id. at 890.
" Id. at 886.
32 Id. at 888.
33 Mathews v. Miller, 25 W. Va. 817 (1885); Boring v. Boring, 2 W. Va. 297
(1867).
=' Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wilson 129 (K.B. 1746).
W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 13 provides in part:
Such parts of the common law, and of the laws of this State as are in force
when this article goes into operation, and are not repugnant thereto, shall
7
Core: Labor Law--Arbitration--Agreements to Arbitrate in West Virginia
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1976
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Legislature should be employed to insure that standard arbitration
clauses in commercial contracts, fairly consented to by the parties,
be enforceable, whether the disputes covered thereunder be of
present existence or of future contemplation," the majority seized
upon the common law exception and found that the language in
the arbitration clause implied that arbitration was a condition
precedent to a right of action."
IV. CONCLUSION
Common law arbitration is still decisive in West Virginia.
While it is recognized that arbitration clauses in commercial con-
tracts should be enforceable, the court will not enforce an agree-
ment to arbitrate future disputes unless it is expressly or impliedly
a condition precedent to a right of action. Miller did not say
whether the arbitration clause would have implied a condition
precedent if a procedural method for arbitration had not been
provided in the agreement.3 1 Without such a provision, standards
to be used in the arbitration proceeding would have to be supplied
by case precedents from court decisions under the common law.
The statutory arbitration procedures in West Virginia are in-
adequate. A modern and comprehensive statute should be enacted
by the legislature. To enforce an arbitration agreement, the courts
should not find it necessary to torture the language of an arbitra-
tion clause to make the agreement come within an exception to an
obsolete common law rule. Parties who voluntarily agree in writing
to arbitrate should be bound by statute and should not as an
afterthought be permitted to escape through the portals of the
common law.3 1 If, as Justice Neely suggests, the court should over-
rule all prior case law in West Virginia insofar as they promote and
protect the common law, statutory guidelines must be established.
Voluntary agreements to arbitrate should be encouraged, but
machinery should be available to enforce such agreements and
awards if compulsion becomes necessary. The only limitation on
be and continue the law of the State until altered or repealed by the
legislature ....
221 S.E.2d at 886.
The arbitration clause provides that the arbitration procedure shall be con-
ducted according to the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
11 Crofoot v. Blair Holding Corp., 119 Cal. App. 2d 156, 260 P.2d 156 (1953).
[Vol. 79
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arbitration should be the extent to which the parties are willing to
submit their differences to decision by an outsider. Parties should
be able to reach agreement on submitting both existing and future
controversies to binding arbitration, and such agreements, made
in good faith, should be irrevocable.
Statutory law gives arbitration a legal foundation with safe-
guards and remedies not available under common law arbitration.
An affirmative legal right to arbitrate gives legal security to the
parties. Such statutes can make submissions legally binding and
provide that an action or suit in the same manner be stayed until
the arbitration has been held. Statutory law can provide that if a
party defaults the court may direct arbitration to proceed or ap-
point arbitrators upon application of the other party. A hearing is
assured and the court will not affirm the award as a judgment
unless the arbitrators are free from bias and corruption. Impor-
tantly, the statute can provide that parties can agree to submit
future disputes to arbitration in the same manner as existing dis-
putes. Failure to arbitrate or carry out an award may be held to
be contempt of the court.
The recent opinion of the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals in Miller clearly demonstrates the need for legislative ac-
tion in West Virginia. The legislature must provide a method for
commercial arbitration. The court cannot.
Roberta Sue Core
9
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